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ABSTRACT
MILLER, JANE E.

The Connections Between Self-Monitoring and Theory of Mind.
Department of Psychology, March 2015.

ADVISOR: DEBONO, KENNETH

Previous research on the personality characteristic of self-monitoring has
shown that high self-monitors constantly adjust their behavior to fit their environment
while low self-monitors follow internal cues to keep their attitudes and behaviors
consistent with one another. Theory of Mind is a person’s ability to connect unobservable
mental and emotional states to one’s self and others, while understanding that other
people may have different thoughts, attitudes and beliefs than one’s self that guides their
behaviors. The current research examined a possible connection between self-monitoring
and theory of mind. Participants completed a self-monitoring scale and two tasks
evaluating their theory of mind. Participants who were high self-monitors had more
correct answers on theory of mind tasks than participants who were low self-monitors.
Low self-monitors showed more theory of mind deficits than high self-monitors,
suggesting that high self-monitors have more intact theory of minds. The research
therefore provides evidence of a previously unknown connection between selfmonitoring and theory of mind, that may be an explanation for individual differences in
self-monitoring.
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One of the most researched concepts in psychology is the personality
characteristic of self-monitoring. Self-monitoring was first introduced by Mark Snyder
(1974, 1979) as a possible explanation for individual differences the controversy over the
extent to which attitudes predicted behavior (Snyder & Monson, 1975). The attitudebehavior controversy reflected the discrepancy between early psychologists’ theories that
attitudes always predicted behaviors and results from their research showing various
levels of consistency between a person’s attitudes and the behaviors they engaged in
(Azjen, Timko, & White, 1982; Liska, 1974). To explain the inconsistencies found in the
research, psychologists started looking for additional variables that may moderate the
relationship between a person’s attitudes and their behaviors (Azjen et al., 1982). Snyder
(1974, 1979) came up with the theory of self-monitoring as the personality characteristic
explaining why some people’s behaviors reflected their attitudes while others showed
little consistency between the two (Snyder & Monson, 1975).
Snyder (1974) proposed that when a person monitors their behavior, they are
observing the behavior and actions of other people surrounding them, as well as
controlling how their individual behavior is outwardly expressed. This means that a
person is constantly monitoring himself or herself and the environment around them at all
times (Snyder 1974, 1979). Individual differences in self-monitoring reflect the extent to
which a person’s behavior may be determined by either situational or dispositional factors
(Snyder & Monson, 1975). The theory of self-monitoring suggests that a person can be
categorized as either a high self-monitor or a low self-monitor according to their scores
on Snyder’s (1974, 1979) Self-Monitoring scale (Snyder & Gangetad, 1986). High self-
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monitors constantly monitor the environment around them and adjust their behavior and
actions to make sure they are situationally appropriate. High self-monitors are sensitive to
and often attend to the demands of the environment or situation surrounding them (Ajzen
et al., 1983; Snyder, 1979). They are very concerned with the impression they give to
others, which has been shown to be a factor in determining their behavior (DeBono &
Omoto, 1993) . Snyder (1974, 1979) also proposes that some people are low selfmonitors, who are people that do not constantly monitor their behavior against the
situation, but rather have consistent attitudes and behaviors. Low self-monitors do not
attempt to make their behavior consistent with the situation or people surrounding them,
but rather their internal feelings. As opposed to high self-monitors who attend to the
environment, low self-monitors follow more internal cues and feelings when performing
behaviors (Ajzen et al., 1982; Snyder, 1979). Since low self-monitors use internal cues
and not the surrounding situation to guide their behavior, their attitudes and behaviors
stay more consistent with each other than high self-monitors, which provided a possible
explanation to the attitude-behavior controversy. (Ajzen et al., 1982, Snyder & Monson,
1975).
Previous research on the relationship between self-monitoring and the attitudebehavior controversy compared the consistency of low self-monitors’ attitudes and
behaviors to those of a high self-monitor. Snyder and Tanke (1975) examined the
attitude-behavior consistency of high and low self-monitors through a forced compliance
experiment, in which the participants were asked to write essays about a controversial
topic. Participants were classified as either low or high self-monitors. The participants
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were divided into two groups, those who were instructed to take their own personal
stance on the essay and those who were persuaded to write from the counter-attitudinal
point of view (Snyder & Tanke, 1975). After completing the essays, the researchers resurveyed the participants on their attitudes about the essay topic. Snyder and Tanke
(1975) found that when the participants were re-surveyed, there was a strong correlation
between the low self-monitors who wrote a counter-attitudinal essay and their final
attitudes on the topic. For high self-monitors however, the stance they took on the essay
and their final attitude about the topic were unrelated (Snyder & Tanke, 1975). Low selfmonitors therefore, had a greater consistency between their attitudes and the behaviors
than high self-monitors, which explained individual differences in the attitude-behavior
controversy (Snyder & Tanke, 1975). In addition, Snyder and Tanke (1975) found that
low self-monitors who were instructed to take a counter-attitudinal stance actually shifted
their final attitudes to be aligned with the behavior of writing from that point of view.
This study suggests that not only do low self-monitors experience a strong attitudebehavior consistency, but also that they may adjust their attitudes to keep them consistent
with their behaviors.
Building off of the research by Snyder and Tanke (1975) showing consistency
between low self-monitors’ attitudes and behaviors, research by DeBono and Omoto
(1993) investigated the attitude-behavior consistency when participants were provided
with environmental cues. In particular, the study examined the differences between high
and low self-monitors’ attitudes in relation to their behavioral intentions when they
exposed to social pressures to perform a certain behavior (DeBono & Omoto, 1993).
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Participants completed the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) and were
asked about their willingness to write a letter that supported raising the legal drinking
age, even if they did not neccesarily agree with that stance (DeBono & Omoto, 1993).
Participants were also surveyed on how much their friends and family would want them
to write the letter and how that influenced their decision. DeBono and Omoto (1993)
found that low self-monitors’ willingness to write the letter was significantly related to
their attitude about the topic, but not to the influence of social pressures. The intentions
of high self-monitors to write the letter however, were related to both their attitudes about
the topic and the perceived social pressures, suggesting that their peers’ opinions had an
influence on their behaviors (DeBono & Omoto, 1993). This study provides additional
evidence that low self-monitors’ attitudes and behaviors stay consistent with each other,
as well as showing that low self-monitors do not seem to be influenced by attitudes other
than their own. Additionally, the relationship between high self-monitors’ letter-writing
intentions and the perceived social pressures suggests that environmental cues may play a
large role in determining their behavior (DeBono & Omoto, 1993).
Further research on the individual differences in how self-monitors react to
situational influences was performed by Klein, Snyder, and Livingston (2004).
Specifically, the study examined at the social influence of a group of prejudice people on
the attitudes of high and low self-monitors. As Snyder’s (1974, 1979) theory of selfmonitoring suggests, high self-monitors often adjust their attitudes to satisfy the
expectations of the people around them at that particular moment (Klein et al., 2004).
Through pre-testing, the researchers collected data on participants’ self-monitoring scores
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and the amount of prejudice each participant felt towards homosexual people (Klein et
al., 2004). A few weeks after collecting the data, Klein et al. (2004) brought the
participants back to the laboratory and told them that they would be discussing their
personal views on homosexual people in a group setting. Half of the participants were
told that they would be with a group of people who were accepting of homosexuality
while the other half was told that they would be with a very prejudiced group (Klein et
al., 2004). Participants were then resurveyed on their attitudes about homosexuality.
Klein et al. (2004) found that high self-monitors who anticipated having to talk to a
prejudiced audience reported more prejudiced attitudes than they previously had. In
connection, high self-monitors reported less prejudicial beliefs when paired with a
supposedly tolerant audience. Low self-monitors’ attitudes towards homosexuality stayed
consistent despite which group they were paired with, suggesting that their attitudes are
not impacted by the same situational factors as high self-monitors (Klein et al., 2004).
Low self-monitors are not affected by others’ actions but rather their internal states in
determining their behavior, while high self-monitors actively adjust their attitudes to stay
consistent with the situation and people that are surrounding them (Klein et al., 2004).
Although the previous research (e.g. DeBono & Omoto, 1993; Klein et al., 2004)
shows that high and low self-monitors react differently to societal influences, does this
mean that other social differences exist between the two groups? Since high self-monitors
adjust their attitudes to match those around them (DeBono & Omoto, 1993; Klein et al.,
2004), might high self-monitors be more socially adept than low self-monitors? An early
study by Furnham and Capon (1982) compared the social skills of high self-monitors to
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those of low self-monitors. Their sample consisted of adults with typical social lives as
well as a group of adults who were undergoing social skills training for various reasons
(Furnham & Capon, 1982). In addition to Snyder’s (1974, 1979) Self-Monitoring Scale,
participants were measured on a variety of social abilities, including their assertiveness
with others and the possible presence of social anxiety, as well as asked questions about
various social situations (Furnham & Capon, 1982). Furnham and Capon (1982) found
that in both the normal and clinical adult sample there was a significant relationship
between self-monitoring and social skills, such that low self-monitors had more deficits
in their social abilities than high self-monitors. Although this study looked very generally
at people’s social skills, it may be that high self-monitors have more social abilities
because of their tendency to attend to environmental cues.
Additional research investigating the differences in social skills among high and
low self-monitors has looked specifically at confirmation bias. Confirmation bias is a
social skill in which a person tends to seek out and selectively attend to information that
supports their already-formed beliefs about a subject (Dardenne & Leyens, 1995).
Dardenne and Leyens (1995) studied confirmation bias by describing to high and low
self-monitoring participants a particular person who was either an introvert or extrovert.
Participants then met the person and formed their own hypothesis about their personality.
Participants were then instructed to choose questions from a pre-determined list that
would best test their hypothesis about the person’s personality (Dardenne & Leyens,
1995). Since confirmation bias is considered a social skill, the researchers believed that
the more socially skilled people would choose questions that would support their pre-
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determined beliefs (Dardenne & Leyens, 1995). Dardenne and Leyens (1995) found that
high self-monitoring individuals were more likely to choose questions that were relevant
to the information they were already provided with, therefor supporting their
predetermined beliefs. In contrast, low self-monitors chose questions that did not
neccesarily support their hypothesis as true, despite the previous knowledge they were
given (Dardenne & Leyens, 1995). Not only did this study provide additional evidence
supporting Furnham and Capon’s (1982) results showing that high self-monitors are more
socially adept than low self-monitors, but it also implied that high self-monitors may be
more socially-skilled because they attend to environmental cues. As seen in the research
by Furnham and Capon (1982) and Dardenne and Leyens (1995), these environmental
cues often are in the form of social cues from other people.
Although the previous research on self-monitoring and social skills was mostly
laboratory-based (e.g. DeBono & Omoto, 1993; Dardenne & Leyens, 1995; Klein et al.,
2004), the connections between self-monitoring and a person’s social abilities have also
been investigated in real-world settings. Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass (2001) looked at the
differences in high and low self-monitors’ social networks in a workplace setting. They
hypothesized that high self-monitors’ social abilities would positively contribute to their
workplace performance by allowing them to form larger social networks than low selfmonitors (Mehra et al., 2001). The researchers gathered data from a real technology firm
with approximately 100 employees. Participants completed the Self-Monitoring Scale
(Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) and various questionnaires regarding their social networks
at work. Data on the employees’ work performance was also gathered from their

Self-Monitoring and Theory of Mind 10

employers (Mehra et al., 2001). Mehra et. al (2001) found that on average, high selfmonitors had stronger work performances than low self-monitors. High self-monitors
also tended to have more central positions in broader social networks than low selfmonitors (Mehra et al., 2001). In other words, high self-monitors’ success at work was
related to their social relationships with many coworkers as well as being the center of
their social circles, while low self-monitors tended to have significantly less social
connections. Being in a central position of their social network demonstrates high selfmonitors’ abilities to form connections between people who would not have had a
relationship otherwise (Mehra et al., 2001; Oh & Kilduff, 2001). This study provides
additional evidence to the previous research suggesting that high self-monitors are more
socially skilled than low self-monitors (e.g. DeBono & Omoto, 1993; Dardenne &
Leyens, 1995; Klein et al., 2004) and shows how these differences are prevalent outside
of the laboratory in real-world settings.
Further studies investigating the relationship between social skills and selfmonitoring have found additional evidence suggesting that high self-monitors are more
socially skilled than low-self monitors. Low self-monitors have been shown to have a
harder time interpreting and understanding vocal cues than high self-monitors, which
indicates that low self-monitors may experience some social deficits related to their
conservation abilities (Mill, 1984). High self-monitors have been shown to be more likely
to initiate and maintain conversations with other people (Ickes, Holloway, Stinson, &
Hoodenpyle, 2006). Evidence suggests that high self-monitors are also more concerned
about making sure those conversations with other people went well, indicating a
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willingness to adjust their behavior to fit the situation (Ickes et al., 2006). As opposed to
low self-monitors who attend to their internal states, high self-monitors are very socially
skilled because of their desire to meet the demands of their environment (Dardenne &
Leyens, 1995; Ickes et al., 2006).
Despite the various research examining the variety of differences between high
and low self-monitors, there is still much that is not known the personality construct
about self-monitoring. One major hole in the research about self-monitoring that needs to
be addressed is why might these individual differences between high self-monitors and
low self-monitors exist? Why are high self-monitors so socially adept compared to low
self-monitors? Why do high self-monitor tend to fit their behavior to the environment
while low self-monitors rely on internal factors to determine their behavior? One possible
explanation for these individual differences is Theory of Mind. High self-monitors may
possess a more developed theory of mind than low self-monitors. Low self-monitors may
experience theory of mind deficits, forcing them to rely on internal states and feelings to
guide their behaviors because they are unable to read the mental states of others.
Theory of Mind is a person’s ability to connect unobservable mental and
emotional states to one’s self and others, while understanding that other people may have
different thoughts, attitudes and beliefs than one’s self that guides their behaviors
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978). This ability helps a person infer, understand and predict
other peoples’ intentions and behaviors (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2001; Premack &
Woodruff, 1978; Yeh, 2013). The concept of theory of mind was first introduced by
Premack and Woodruff (1978) in their research on chimpanzees observing human actors.
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The chimpanzees were shown video clips of humans in a cage struggling to get a banana
that was out of their reach. The researchers then showed the chimpanzees pictures of
possible solutions to the human’s problem (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). The
chimpanzees were able to choose the correct solution for the majority of the videos,
leading Premack and Woodruff (1978) to suggest that chimpanzees had a theory of mind
because of their ability to predict the behavior of human actors.
Although the beginning research on theory of mind used chimpanzees as subjects,
theory of mind has been shown to be an innate but varying ability in humans that
originates in their early childhood (Lillard & Kavanaugh, 2014). The beginnings of
theory of mind occurs in children between four and five years old (e.g. Lillard &
Kavanaugh, 2014; Morino, 2005; Wright & Mahfoud, 2012). The development of theory
of mind represents a shift in the way children view other people; they start to understand
that other peoples’ behaviors are not random but rather motivated acts (Lillard &
Kavanaugh, 2014). The development of theory of mind is also related to a person’s ability
to take on the perspective of other people, which in turn is what allows them to
understand and predict others’ behaviors (Lillard & Kavanaugh, 2014; Premack &
Woodruff, 1978).
Previous research on the development of theory of mind in children has examined
the strong connection between theory of mind and the ability to take on the perspective of
another person. Harwood and Farrar (2006) conducted a study investigating how theory
of mind was related to children’s abilities to understand differences between their’s and
others’ emotional states, also known as affective perspective taking (Harwood & Farrar,
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2006). The researchers pooled a sample of three to five year-old children and gave them a
variety of tasks meant to measure the development of their theory of mind. Children were
asked to identify their best friend and talk about how they and their friend would feel in a
variety of scenarios that analyzed the child’s ability to infer their friends’ emotional states
(Harwood & Farrar, 2006). For example, children might have been asked how they would
feel if they won something that their friend really wanted to win. A person who is able to
successfully attribute emotions to oneself and others would understand that even though
they are happy about winning, their friend may be sad about losing (Harwood & Farrar,
2006). Harwood and Farrar (2006) found that the development of the children’s theory of
mind was strongly related to a child’s ability to correctly predict their friends’ emotions in
different social scenarios, suggesting that a person’s theory of mind is connected to
perspective-taking abilities. Additional research has shown that a well-developed theory
of mind correlates with a child’s accurate interpretation and understanding of emotions in
other people, which provides additional evidence that theory of mind abilities are related
to a child’s ability to think about a situation from another person’s point of view (Mier et
al., 2010; Morino, 2005).
Since previous studies (e.g. Harwood & Farrar, 2006; Mier et al., 2010; Morino,
2005) show a connection between the development of a child’s theory of mind and their
understanding of other children’s emotions, might similar connections between theory of
mind and social abilities exist for adults? One study run by Yeh (2013) investigated the
influence of theory of mind on the social abilities of older adults. Yeh (2013) believes that
theory of mind may be the strongest predictor of a person’s social intelligence. The study
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pooled a sample of adults over the age of 50 who had never experienced psychological
issues or mental illness, as that may affect their theory of mind abilities (Yeh, 2013).
Participants were analyzed on a series of theory of mind tasks meant to measure their
abilities to comprehend and infer the motivations behind other people’s behaviors. They
also completed a measure of social intelligence (Yeh, 2013). Yeh (2013) found that
participants’ performance on the theory of mind tasks was strongly correlated with their
social intelligence, such that more socially intelligent participants performed better on the
theory of mind tasks. Not only does this confirm the results found by Harwood and Farrar
(2006) about the relationship between theory of mind and the ability to understand other
people’s behaviors, but it also provides evidence that a person’s theory of mind is
connected to their general social abilities (Yeh, 2013).
Although previous research (e.g., Lillard & Kavanaugh, 2014; Premack &
Woodruff, 1978; Yeh, 2013) has shown theory of mind to be an innate trait among
humans that is connected to a person’s social abilities, additional studies have
investigated how deficits in one’s theory of mind may explain their lack of social skills,
particularly among people with mental disorders. The majority of studies researching
theory of mind deficits have used clinical patients as participants, as they tend to possess
more deficits than a typical person (Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, & Solomonica-Levi, 1998).
One meta-analysis examined data from multiple studies comparing normal and clinical
adult populations. Effect sizes from the meta-analysis determined that theory of mind
deficits occurred significantly more in the autistic and Down syndrome samples than in
the typical adult population (Yirmiya et al., 1998). The study also showed that autistic
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individuals had much more severe theory of mind deficits than did Down syndrome
individuals (Yirmiya et al., 1998). In recent research, theory of mind deficits are thought
to be one of the current explanations for Autism Spectrum Disorders, since many of the
social impairments shown by autistic people are related to the abilities gained through the
development of theory of mind (Frith, Happe, & Siddons, 1994; Yirmiya et al., 1998).
Theory of mind deficits refer to a person’s difficulty with taking on the perspective of
other people, including lacking an understanding about the motivations and intentions
behind someone else’s behavior, and the effects that their own behavior may have on
others (Harwood & Farrar, 2006; Frith et al., 1994; Yirmiya et al, 1998). These deficits
are also some of the social impairments experienced by those with Autism Spectrum
Disorders (ASDs) (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Firth, 1985; Frith et al, 1994; Yirmiya et al,
1998).
The early research on the connections between theory of mind and autism
examined the autistic child’s theory of mind through the False-Belief task (Wimmer &
Perner, 1983). The false-belief task requires an ability to attribute a thought to another
person, making it a viable measure of theory of mind (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). In the
false-belief task, participants are shown a scenario where a character is aware of the
location of a specific object, but then another character hides the object when the original
character leaves the room. The participant is then asked where the original character
would look for the object when they came back into the room (Wimmer & Perner, 1983).
In order to correctly complete the false-belief task, children would have to understand
that the characters’ knowledge of the location differs from the child’s own knowledge
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(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) gave
this task to children with autism and found that only 20% of the autistic children were
able separate their personal knowledge from the character’s knowledge. This led the
researchers to conclude that autistic individuals are unable to attribute thoughts to other
people and therefore lack a fully developed theory of mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985).
Building off of the research by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Firth (1985), additional
studies that showed between theory of mind and autism looked specifically at an autistic
individual’s social deficits through the Faux-Pas Recognition Task (Stone, Baron-Cohen,
& Knight, 1998; Gregory et al., 2002) . In the Faux-Pas Recognition task, researchers
read stories to participants in which a character offends another character. Participants are
then surveyed about the true intentions behind the characters’ comments (Stone et al.,
1998; Gregory et al., 2002). In one particular study, Zalla, Sav, Stopic, Ahade, and
Leboyer (2009) employed this task with a group of Asperger patients. Asperger’s
Syndrome is a highly functioning form of autism (Zalla et al., 2009). Results showed that
the participants actually overestimated the amount of faux-pas in the stories, such that
they thought that characters insulted the other characters more than they actually did
(Zalla et al., 2009) They were also not able to give correct reasoning for intentions of the
speakers. Zalla et al. (2009) believes that people with autism perform worse on this task
because of an impaired theory of mind.
An additional measure of theory of mind relies on an individual’s ability to
attribute emotional states to persons other than themselves. During the Reading the Mind
in the Eyes task (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2001) participants are presented with
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photographs of peoples’ eyes and words describing different emotions, and participants
are asked to chose the correct emotional state expressed from each photograph of eyes. In
order to give correct answers, participants must be able to read the emotions by taking on
the perspectives of the people in the photographs and correctly attributing their mental
states (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2001). One such study employing this task
examined the differences between high-functioning autistic individuals and typicallydeveloping individuals in their ability to attribute emotional states (Baron-Cohen &
Wheelwright, 2001). Baron- Cohen and Wheelwright (2001) administered the Reading
the Mind in the Eyes task to a sample consisting of a clinical and normal population.
Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2001) found that autistic individuals had more incorrect
answers about the emotions being conveyed by the eyes than did individuals in the
normal population, leading the researchers to believe that the autistic individuals lacked
the ability to correctly attribute emotional states to other people. This study, along with
the research done by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) and Zalla et al, (1999), provides
additional evidence about the strong relationship between autism and theory of mind
deficits
While theory of mind has many different complex facets, it may be the
explanation for the individual differences in the major personality construct of selfmonitoring. It may be that low self-monitors do not purposefully attend to their internal
states instead of environmental cues, but rather their theory of mind deficits prohibits
them from being able to read the mental states of others. It may be that low self-monitors
experience a stronger attitude-behavior consistency than high self-monitors because their
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theory of mind deficits rid them of their abilityto take others’ opinions into account when
determining their behaviors (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; DeBono & Omoto, 1993; Snyder
& Monson, 1975). As previous research has shown (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1985;
Dardenne & Leyens, 1995; Klein et al., 2004), high self-monitors possess many of the
social abilities that are also present in people with well-developed theory of minds.
Although there are no studies that directly connect the two concepts, a significant portion
of research in both theories has examined the same variables, and various connections
can be seen across those studies
Research connecting Self-Monitoring and Theory of Mind
A fair amount of research has been performed with children examining the
development of theory of mind, especially in regards to how theory of mind predicts a
child’s social skills. Suway, Degnan, Sussman, and Fox (2012) studied the relationship
between theory of mind and peer interactions among children. They ran a longitudinal
study, meeting with children who were 24 months of age and then again when they were
36 months. Suway et al. (2012) hypothesized that children who are high in negative peer
interactions and negative social behaviors at 24 months would show worse theory of
mind abilities at 36 months. Children were observed at 24 months and coded on positive
and negative peer interactions. They were then tested a year later, at 36 months, on
various theory of mind tasks. Results showed that children high in negative peer
interaction and negative social behaviors performed worse on Theory of Mind tasks at 36
months. This research implied that negative peer interactions may harm theory of mind

Self-Monitoring and Theory of Mind 19
development, but at the very least it shows a clear connection between having worse
theory of mind abilities and more negative peer interactions.
While extensive research has been done on theory of mind and children, there are
a significant lack of studies examining the characteristic of self-monitoring in children,
with the exception of the research conducted by Graziano, Leone, Musser and
Lautenschlager (1987). Graziano et al. (1987) set out to create a way to measure selfmonitoring in children. They constructed the Junior Self-Monitoring scale, which
consisted of 48 items intended to measure high or low self monitoring in children. Items
were written with the intent of being appropriate for elementary school children and the
interactions they faced in their daily settings (e.g., I can be nice to people I don’t like and
I sometimes clown around so my classmates like me) (Graziano et al., 1987). Graziano et
al. (1987) tested the validity of this measure by administering it to second, third, fourth
and fifth graders in an elementary school program. Participants were observed in their
social interactions, particularly theirsocial comparison behaviors, before, during and after
the completion of the survey. Children who scored as high self-monitors were more likely
to engage in social-comparison interactions, as well as attend to the wants and decisions
of other children much more frequently and for a longer duration than children who
scored as low self-monitors (Graziano et al., 1987). Low self-monitors may not be able to
attend to the decisions of other children because they may possess theory of mind deficits
prohibiting them from differing between their own and others’ mental states.
One could infer from Graziano et al.,’s (1987) research that high self monitoring
children would tend to have more positive peer interactions. In connection, some
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prosocial behaviors between children, such as sharing, that may lead to positive peer
interactions have been shown to be positively correlated with a more well-developed
theory of mind. Wu and Su (2014) ran a study on the relationship between preschoolers’
theory of mind abilities and prosocial tendencies. The study specifically investigated the
behavior of sharing. Wu and Su (2014) hypothesized that children with better theory of
mind abilities would engage in more sharing behaviors, even with less straightforward
social signals from the other child. Previous research had shown that children undergo an
increase in the amount of initiated sharing behaviors at around the same age that theory
of mind is shown to develop (Wu & Su, 2014). Wu and Su (2014) pooled a sample of
children ranging in age from two to four years old. The children underwent a series of
sharing tasks where they were placed in a room with a stranger who made both implicit
(i.e., “These toys are so cool!”) and explicit (“Would you please give me some to play
with?”) remarks meant to initiate sharing behaviors (Wu & Su, 2014). The children also
completed five theory of mind tasks, including the previously researched False-Belief
task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Results showed a significant age effect in both the
Theory of Mind and sharing tasks, such that older children engaged in more sharing
behaviors and performed better on the theory of mind tasks (Wu & Su, 2014). Results
also showed that the children’s theory of mind scores were positively correlated to their
sharing scores, such that the participants who performed better on theory of mind tasks
were also likely to engage in more sharing behaviors (Wu & Su, 2014). Wu and Su
(2014) observed that children with a more developed Theory of Mind were more likely to
share, even when their partner was making implicit and subtle comments about the toys,
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as opposed to children with less developed theory of minds who more often had to be
explicitly asked to share. This ties into previous research (e.g., Ajzen et al., 1982;
DeBono & Omoto, 1993) suggesting that high self-monitors rely on situational cues to
determine their behavior. Wu and Su (2014), along with Graziano et al., (1987) and
Suway et al., (2012) shows that children high in negative peer interactions tend to do
poorer on theory of mind tasks, as well as that being a high self-monitor is correlated
with having more positive peer interactions, suggesting that high self-monitors may have
more developed theory of minds than low self-monitors.
While there are studies connecting negative peer interactions to both theory of
mind deficits and low self-monitors in children, do the same connections exist for adults?
One explanation why individuals with theory of mind deficits experience more negative
peer interactions is their struggle with recognizing emotions on faces (Baron-Cohen &
Wheelwright, 2001). Wallace, Coleman, and Bailey (2008) found that those with Autism
Spectrum Disorders struggled with recognizing the basic emotions of sadness, fear and
anger due to their theory of mind deficits. Building upon that research, Mier et al. (2010)
conducted research on how a well-developed theory of mind is related to recognizing
emotions on others’ faces. The study examined theory of mind from a neuroscience
perspective by trying to show a connection using imaging studies. Mier et al. (2010)
hypothesized that there would be a correlation between having a well-developed theory
of mind and doing well on emotion recognition tasks and that that connection would be
apparent on a neurobiological level. Participants were shown images of facial emotions
and asked to rate the intensity of them on a five-point Likert scale, with 1 representing
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the least intense and 5 the most (Mier et. al, 2010). Participants were also asked to
complete a theory of mind inventory. While this was happening, the researchers ran fMRI
imaging studies on the participants in an attempt to show the connection. Results showed
activation around the inferior frontal gyrus, superior temporal sulcus,temporal pole and
amygdala for both emotion recognition and theory of mind, suggesting a strong neural
connection between the two (Mier et. al, 2010). Mier et. al (2010) demonstrated that the
ability to correctly recognize emotions and having an well-developed theory of mind is
strongly connected.
While difficulty with recognizing emotions has been shown to be connected with
theory of mind deficits, could a possible connection be seen with self-monitoring as well?
One such study researching self monitoring and emotion recognition was performed by
Mufson and Nowicki (1991). Mufson and Nowicki (1991) conducted a study on
nonverbal communication and specifically investigated emotional facial expressions.
They tested how self-monitoring may predict a participant’s abilities on the Brief Affect
Recognition Test (BART). The BART measures participants‘ abilities to recognize the
emotions of other people (Mufson & Nowicki, 1991). Some participants were told that
the ability to recognize emotions is a predictor of social competence, while others were
told that it was not (Mufson & Nowicki, 1991). Mufson and Nowicki (1991) found that
high self-monitors were better at reading facial expressions than low self-monitors. This
study is key to connecting self monitoring and theory of mind deficits, because one of the
trademarks of theory of mind deficits is lacking the ability to accurately read others’
emotions on their faces (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2001). Unsurprisingly, autistic
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patients also tend to show difficulty in this area because of their theory of mind deficits
(Wallace et al., 2008). Therefore, this could be another possible link between low self
monitors and theory of mind deficits.
Another reason low self monitors and those with theory of mind deficits may
struggle with social interactions is because of problems with comprehending the true
meaning of what people are saying. Low self-monitors have been shown to have
difficulty understanding the intentions behind other people’s behaviors (Mill, 1984). Mill
(1984) studied high and low self-monitors and their ability to interpret the meanings of
others’ sentences. Mill (1984) hypothesized that high self monitors would be better than
low self monitors at decoding verbal cues accurately. Mill (1984) studied participants’
ability to understand vocal cues correctly through the Inferred Meanings Test, where the
researchers read out loud sentences to the participants and then asked them what the
sentence was trying to convey (Mill, 1984). Results showed that higher self monitors
were able to correctly infer more meanings and emotions than low self monitors. This
shows a connection between low self monitors and their ability to correctly understand
other people’s intentions behind their behaviors through more subtle verbal cues.
Building off of Mill’s (1984) research on verbal cues, additional research on self
monitoring and social skill deficits has been performed using patients with schizophrenia.
Penn et al. (1999) conducted research examining the connections between self monitoring
and social cognition skills in schizophrenic patients. Participants with schizophrenia
completed Snyder’s (1974) Self Monitoring Scale and a task meant to assess their social
skills, particularly their paralinguistic abilities. Paralinguistic abilities refers to a person’s
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capability to pick up on implicit cues in social interactions, such as body language or
sarcastic tones (Penn et al., 1999). Penn et al. (1999) found that schizophrenic patients
who scored as high self-monitors tended to have greater paralinguistic skills than those
who were rated as low self-monitors. In connection to Mill’s (1984) research, it seems
that people who score as low self-monitors tend to struggle with understanding subtle
verbal cues and true intentions in social situations.
Low self-monitors are known to struggle with paralinguistic skills in conversation
(e.g. Mill, 1984; Penn et al., 1999) but can the same be said for people with theory of
mind deficits? Having an impoverished theory of mind is a common trait among
schizophrenic patients (Casetta & Goghari, 2014). Connecting to Penn et al.’s (1984)
research on low self-monitoring schizophrenic patients and their social skills, Cassetta
and Goghari (2014) investigated theory of mind deficits in relation to the social
functioning of schizophrenic patients and their immediate family members. Casetta and
Goghari (2014) tested participants using vignettes of social situations showing actors who
were either lying or speaking sarcastically. The participant then had to answer questions
about the scene, specifically about actor’s intended meaning. The researchers found that
schizophrenic patients with theory of mind deficits scored significantly lower on both
sarcasm comprehension and lie comprehension (Cassetta & Goghari, 2014). They
especially showed issues with understanding the intentions of the actors. This is yet
another important possible connection between self monitoring and theory of mind.
Sarcasm could be considered a paralinguistic skill since it relies on a person’s tone and
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delivery, so it may be that low self-monitors have theory of mind deficits contributing to
their social intelligence.
The possible connections between self monitoring and theory of mind discussed
above have led the current research to investigate a possible relationship between theory
of mind and self-monitoring. Low self monitors have shown to experience the some of
the same social impairments that those with theory of mind deficits experience (e.g.
Cassetta & Goghari, 2014; Furnham & Capon, 1982; Graziano et al., 1987; Mier et. al,
2010; Mill, 1984). Low self-monitors may have a stronger attitude-behavior consistency
(e.g., DeBono & Omoto, 1993) than high self-monitors because their theory of mind
deficits prohibit them from relying on their environmental surroundings to determine
their behavior, so they are forced to attend to their internal states. High self-monitors on
the other hand have been shown to be very socially skilled people (e.g., Furnham &
Capon, 1982, Mehra et al., 2001). Many of those social skills, especially the attribution of
behaviors and perspective taking (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2001; Harwood &
Farrar, 2006) have been shown to relate to theory of mind abilities, while low selfmonitors lack these same skills. This leads the current research to speculate that there is a
significant connection between the two concepts. Specifically, the current research
hypothesizes that there will be a positive relationship between self-monitoring and theory
of mind, such that high self-monitors will perform better on theory of mind tasks than
low self-monitors. Based upon the previous research by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985)
showing the connections between theory of mind deficits and autism, the current research
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also hypothesizes that low self-monitors will score higher on the Autism Spectrum
Quotient than high self-monitors.
Method
Materials
The current research tested theory of mind deficits through Adult Faux-Pas
Recognition task (Stone et al., 1998; Gregory et al., 2002), where researchers read
participants stories of social interactions and are asked to identify the social faux-pas (See
Appendix A). The task consists of ten stories that include a social faux pas, such as a
character insulting another character, and ten control stories that do not contain a fauxpas. Participants heard the story and were then asked a series of questions about the story.
For example, a story containing a faux pas would be as follows: Jill had just moved into a
new apartment. Jill went shopping and bought some new curtains for her bedroom. When
she had just finished decorating the apartment, her best friend, Lisa, came over. Jill gave
her a tour of the apartment and asked, "How do you like my bedroom?" "Those curtains
are horrible," Lisa said. "I hope you're going to get some new ones!" (Stone et al., 1998;
Gregory et al., 2002). Participants are then asked “Did anyone say something they
shouldn’t have said or something awkward?” If participants say yes, a series of questions
meant to identify the specific faux-pas and the character’s true intentions are asked.
Control questions are also asked to make sure the participant is comprehending the story.
For example, a control question for the story above would be “How long had Jill lived in
the apartment?” (Stone et al., 1998; Gregory et al., 2002). Participants also had a copy of
the stories without the questions placed in front of them in case they needed to refer back.
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The Faux-Pas Recognition Task has been shown to have a good test-retest reliability and
is a more sensitive and valid measurement of theory of mind (Zalla et al., 2009).
The second Theory of Mind task employed by the current research is the Revised
Adult Version of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright,
2001). The task consists of 37 black and white photographs of peoples’ eyes (See
Appendix B). Each photograph is accompanied by four words describing an emotional
state. One of the four words is a target emotion that accurately describes the emotion on
the set of eyes, and the other three words are ones chosen that are close to the target
emotion but not close enough to be incorrectly identified by those without theory of mind
deficits. For example, if the target emotion is nervous, the other three words might be
puzzled, insisting, and contemplative (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2001). Participants
are asked to choose one of the four words to identify the emotion being conveyed by the
set of eyes. They are provided with a glossary with the definitions of each emotional
state, a sample sentence using that words, and an answer sheet to record their answer on
(Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2001). The current research employed the Revised Adult
Version instead of the original version, as it is shown to be more reliable and valid
because it uses photographs of complex emotional states instead of basic ones (BaronCohen & Wheelwright, 2001). Examples of basic emotional states include sad, angry,
happy, while examples of complex emotional states found in the Revised Adult Version
include indifferent, baffled, ashamed, and playful (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2001).
The current research measured self-monitoring through the widely used 18-item
Revised Self Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) (See Appendix C). High and
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low self-monitors are categorized by their responses on the Self-Monitoring Scale
(Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). The self-monitoring scale that was originally
written by Snyder (1974) consisted of 25 items about self-presentation and attitudes, but
it had issues with validity and did not align with previous research (Briggs, Cheek, &
Buss, 1980; Lennox & Wolfe, 1984). It was once rewritten into 13 items (Lennox &
Wolfe, 1984), but was most recently written into an 18 item scale (Snyder & Gangestad,
1986). The widely-used 18 item scale includes items relating to a person’s internal
beliefs and their interactions with others, such asI would not change my opinion (or the
way I do things in order to please someone or win their favor and I find it hard to imitate
the behavior of other people (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). Participants rate the items as
either true or false. The revised 18-item version is considered more reliable and valid
than the original version yet strongly correlates with the original 25-item measure
(Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). When scoring the questionnaire, each statement answered
“true” to is awarded one point but 10 of the statements are reverse scored. Participants
scoring at a 10 and above are considered high self-monitors while those under 9 are low
self-monitors.
The Autism-Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, &
Clubley, 2001) was developed as a self-report measure to identify where individuals may
lie on the autism spectrum (See Appendix D). It is used as a diagnostic tool for Autism
Spectrum Disorders (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The self-report test consists of 50 items
on five different areas analyzing autistic symptoms, including items such as I usually
notice car license plates or similar strings of information, I find social situations easy,

Self-Monitoring and Theory of Mind 29
and When I talk on the phone, I’m not sure when it’s my turn to speak (Baron-Cohen et
al., 2001). Participants are asked to think about the statements and respond using a four
point Likert scale, where 1 = definitely disagree and 4 = definitely agree. Responses are
scored by given one point for “agree” answers on certain items and one point for
“disagree” items on other answers. Scores above 31 are thought to be indicative of an
Autism Spectrum Disorder (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The current research employs the
Autism-Spectrum Quotient because of autism’s close relationship with theory of mind
deficits (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985).
Participants
Sixty-six students and staff at Union College took part in the study to fulfill a
psychology course requirement or for monetary compensation ($4). 46 females and 20
males participated in the study. Ages ranged from 17 to 77 years old (M = 21.33). Based
on their scores on Snyder & Gangestad’s (1986) 18-item Self Monitoring Scale, 32 of the
participants were classified as high self-monitors (scored equal to 10 or greater) and 34
were classified as low self-monitors (scored 9 and under).
Procedure
Upon their arrival to the lab, each participant was informed that they were
participating in a study on social skills and decision-making, and that they would answer
questions about some stories as well as complete a variety of surveys. Participants
completed an informed consent form. First, the researcher then administered the Adult
Version of the Faux-Pas Recognition Task (Stone et al., 1998; Gregory et al., 2002).
Participants were told that they were going to be read some stories about social situations
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and then asked questions about those stories. Participants also had a copy of just the
stories without the researchers’ questions in front of them for reference. The researcher
read out loud each story and asked the relevant questions for each story while writing
down the participants’ answers on the researcher’s version of the task.
Participants next completed the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2001). Participants were told that they were going to be presented with pictures of
eyes surrounded by four words, and instructed to choose the word that they felt best fit
the emotion shown by the eyes.They were instructed not to rush and make sure they read
all the words, but advised to complete the task as quickly as they could. Participants were
also provided with a glossary of the words in case they were unaware of their meanings.
Participants circled their answers on answer sheets. At this time, each participant
recorded their age and gender on their Reading the Mind in the Eyes answer sheet. After
the completion of the theory of mind tasks, participants then completed the Self
Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986), which was labeled as a Personal Reaction
Inventory. Lastly, participants completed the Autism Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen et
al., 2001) but they were unaware that it measured autistic tendencies. After participants
finished all four tasks, they were thanked, debriefed, told the true nature of the study, and
dismissed. Every participant took the study individually in the laboratory with only the
researcher present. The complete study took each participant between 30 and 45 minutes.
Scoring the Tasks
The participants‘ answers to each task were scored according to the original
researcher’s answer key who developed the task. To score the Adult Faux-Pas
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Recognition task (Stone et al., 1998; Gregory et al., 2002), the faux-pas stories and
control stories were scored separately. For each of the ten control stories, participants
received two points for correctly answering “no” when asked Did anyone say something
they shouldn’t have said or something awkward? (Stone et al., 1998; Gregory et al.,
2002). Participants received zero points if they answered “yes” when read a control story
(Stone et al., 1998; Gregory et al., 2002). There was a total of 20 possible points for the
control stories. For each of the 10 faux pas stories, participants received one point for
answering “yes” to the above question, as well as one point each for correctly identifying
who made the faux-pas, why it was a faux-pas, the person’s intentions in saying it,
whether the person was aware of the situation and how the person felt (Stone et al., 1998;
Gregory et al., 2002). If a participant answered the first question right but subsequent
questions wrong, they were scored between one and six points depending on the number
of questions they correctly answered. This results in six possible points for each of the 10
faux-pas stories, for a total of 60 possible points (Stone et al., 1998; Gregory et al., 2002).
The control questions for both the faux-pas and control stories were asked only for
reliability and were not scored. The scores for the control stories and the faux-pas stories
were entered into the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) separately.
To score the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task, the current research relied on the
answer key developed by Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright (2001). Participants are scored
one point for each emotion they correctly identified and zero points for incorrectly
identifying it, for a total of 36 possible points. The raw score out of 36 was then entered
into SPSS.
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In order to analyze Snyder and Gangestad’s (1986) 18-item self-monitoring scale,
participants received both a numerical score and a self-monitoring categorization.
Participants were given one point for each answer of “False” on items numbered 1, 2, 3,
7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15 and 16, and were scored one point for each answer of “True” on items
4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 17 and 18 (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). The points were then added up
for a total numerical score out of a possible 18 points. According to Snyder and
Gangestad (1986), those with a score of 10 and above are classified as high self-monitors
while those who score 9 and under are low self-monitors. Both the participant’s
numerical score and high/low categorization were entered into SPSS separately.
For the last task, the Autism Spectrum Quotient (Baron- Cohen et al., 2001),
participants responded to 50 items on a 4 point Likert-type scale , 1 and 2 representing
“Definitely agree” and “slightly agree” and 3 and 4 representing “Slightly disagree” and
“definitely disagree” respectively (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Answers of “Definitely
agree” or “slightly agree” were scored one point on items 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 16, 18,
19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 33, 35, 39, 41, 42, 43, 45 and 46. Responses of “Definitely
disagree” or “slightly disagree” were scored one point on items 3, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 17,
24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37, 38, 40, 44, 47, 48, 49 and 50 (Baron-Cohen et
al., 2001). The points were then added together for a total possible score of 50 points. The
raw score was then entered into SPSS.
Results
To examine the association between participant’s self-monitoring classifications
(i.e. high or low self-monitors) and their performance on the theory of mind tasks, the
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current research submitted participant’s scores on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task,
their score on the Faux-Pas stories and control stories from the Adult version of the Faux
Pas recognition task and their raw score from the Autism Spectrum Quotient to an
independent samples t-test (See Table 1). As hypothesized, high self-monitors and low
self-monitors differed on their scores in the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task, t (64) =
3.52, p = .001, such that high self-monitors (M = 28.28) correctly identified more
emotions than low self-monitors (M = 25.06). In connection, high self-monitors and low
self-monitors also differed on their identification of social faux-pas in the Faux-Pas
Recognition task, t (64) = 3.55, p = .001, such that high self- monitors (M = 54.06)
correctly identified more social faux-pas than did low self-monitors (M = 46.91). There
was no significant difference in the control stories of the Faux-Pas Recognition Task, t
(64) = .58, p = .57, such that high self-monitors (M = 18.34) and low self-monitors (M =
18.00) both correctly identified when there was no faux-pas. High and low self-monitors
also differed in terms of their scores on the Autism Spectrum Quotient, t (64) = -4.36, p
< .001, such that low self-monitors (M = 21.21) scored higher and showed more autistic
tendencies than high self-monitors (M = 14.41). There was no significant difference with
age or gender.
To confirm the results found by the independent samples t-test, we also submitted
participants’ numerical self-monitoring score and theory of mind task scores to a
Pearson’s Correlation. As hypothesized, participants’ numerical self-monitoring scores
were positively correlated with their scores on the Faux Pas Recognition Task, r (64)= .
31, p = .01, such that high self-monitoring scores were associated with correctly
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identifying social faux-pas. There was no significant association between participant’s
self-monitoring scores and their responses on the control stories in the Faux-Pas task, r
(64) = .04, p = .73. Self-monitoring scores were also positively related to the scores on
the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task, r (64) = .30, p = .01, such that high selfmonitoring scores were associated with correctly identifying others’ emotions. In align
with the hypothesis, there was a negative relationship between participant’s numerical
self-monitoring scores and their score on the Autism Spectrum Quotient, r (64) = -.499,
p < .001, such that lower self-monitoring scores were associated with higher scores on the
Autism Spectrum Quotient. No significant association was found with the age or gender
of the participants. These correlations using the numerical self-monitoring score confirms
the results found in the independent samples t-test when participants were categorized as
either high or low self-monitors.
Discussion
Previous research on self-monitoring has shown that high self-monitors constantly
monitor and adjust their behavior to appropriately match their social settings while low
self-monitors attend to their internal cues to keep their attitudes and behaviors consistent
despite their surroundings (Ajzen et al., 1982; Snyder, 1979; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986).
The current research set out to investigate individual differences in self-monitoring and
how that relates to individual differences in another well-researched construct, theory of
mind. Theory of mind is a person’s ability to not only connect internal states to oneself
and one’s emotions, but also to understand that other people have their own needs, wishes
and thoughts that may drive their behaviors (Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Baron-Cohen
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& Wheelwright, 2001). Past studies have looked at many of the same variables within the
two constructs but the connection between self-monitoring and theory of mind had yet to
be discovered before the current research.
In the current research, it was hypothesized that high self-monitors would score
higher on theory of mind tasks than low self-monitors. Since previous research has shown
high self-monitors to be more socially skilled than low self-monitors (i.e. Mehra et al.,
2001;Mill, 1984; Penn et al., 1999) it was hypothesized that high self-monitors would
correctly identify more social faux-pas on the Adult Version of the Faux-Pas recognition
task than low self-monitors. It was also hypothesized that low self-monitors would score
significantly lower than high self-monitors on theory of mind tasks, therefore showing
that low self-monitors have more theory of mind deficits than high self-monitors.
Participants completed two theory of mind tasks: the Reading the Mind in the Eyes task
(Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2001) and the Adult version of the Faux-Pas Recognition
task (Stone et al., 1998; Gregory et al., 2002), along Snyder & Gangestad’s (1986) Self
Monitoring Scale and the Autism Spectrum Quotient (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). Results
showed a positive relationship between participants’ self-monitoring scores and theory of
mind scores, and a negative correlation with participants’ self-monitoring scores and
Autism Spectrum Quotient scores. In general, participants who were high self-monitors
scored higher on the two theory of mind tasks than low self-monitors. In addition,
participants who were low self-monitors scored higher on the Autism Spectrum Quotient
than high self-monitors. Thus, the current research’s hypotheses were fully supported.
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The correlations between high self-monitoring scores and high theory of mind
scores leads the current research to conclude that low self-monitors have more
impoverished theory of minds than high self-monitors. Although no published studies
have explored a connection between the two constructs, previous research has shown that
low self-monitors experience many of the same social skill impairments that those with
theory of mind deficits have (Graziano et al., 1987; Mier et. al., 2010; Mill, 1984:
Cassetta & Goghari, 2014). Even though there is no previous research analyzing the two
constructs together to compare the current data to, previous research by Zalla et al. (2001)
on the Adult Faux-Pas recognition task found that Asperger patients actually overestimated the amount of faux-pas in the stories. Our data contradicts that, as can be seen
through the separate scores for the faux-pas stories and the control stories. If those with
theory of mind deficits had overestimated the amount of faux-pas then their scores on the
control stories should reflect that. Our data showed that theory of mind deficits are shown
through the person’s inability to recognize correct intentions and social faux-pas.
The correlation between self-monitoring and theory of mind opens up a possible
explanation for individual differences in self-monitoring. Although the current research is
correlational therefore we are not able to attribute causal factors, previous research on the
development of theory of mind and self-monitoring may shed some light on the
explanation behind the results. Previous studies have shown theory of mind develops in
children between four and five years old (e.g. Lillard & Kavanaugh, 2014; Morino, 2005;
Wright & Mahfoud, 2012), while self-monitoring has been shown to develop slightly
later between six and 12 years old (Graziano et al, 1987). It may be that low self-monitors
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are forced to attend to their internal cues because their theory of mind deficits prevent
them from being able to take on others’ perspectives and differentiate them from their
own thoughts. If low self-monitors are unable to take on the perspectives of others and
understand that other people have different thoughts and intentions than them, then they
are forced to attend to their internal state to determine their behavior. Low self-monitors
may struggle with social skills because of their inability to take on others’ perspectives,
especially their intentions and beliefs. The current research shows this with the Faux-Pas
recognition task, where low self-monitors struggled with understanding the characters’
intentions and true meanings. Previous research with recognizing emotions in others have
shown that high self-monitors are better at reading facial cues (Mufson & Nowicki,
1991), and this is backed up by the current study. Recognizing facial emotions also is
related to having a well-developed theory of mind (Mier et. al., 2010). High self-monitors
may be able to better attribute emotions to other people because they possess a more
advanced theory of mind than low self-monitors. High self-monitors may be more
socially skilled because their well-developed theory of minds allow them to better
understand the motivating factors behind others’ behaviors and align their behaviors with
that. With theory of mind showing to develop slightly before self-monitoring, it may be
that theory of mind deficits are the core explanation for individual differences in selfmonitoring.
In addition to the theoretical connection between self-monitoring and theory of
mind, this study has real-world implications as well. Although a variety of studies have
been run on high and low self-monitors’ individual differences in social skills, this
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concept has not been studied from the focus of theory of mind. Previous research on selfmonitoring in the workplace has shown that high self-monitors achieve more central
leadership positions in their occupation than do low self-monitors (Mehra et al., 2001).
High self-monitors also tend to have more work-related successes and stay in their jobs
longer than low self-monitors (Mehra et al., 2001). When looking at these results from a
theory of mind standpoint, it may be that high self-monitors occupy more central
positions in their networks because they possess a well-developed theory of mind
allowing them to take take on the perspectives of other employees and customers. By
having a better understanding of the connections between theory of mind and selfmonitoring, both employees and employers may be able to add or remove social events
that may have an impact on the work environment. For instance, high self-monitors have
been shown to better understand verbal cues and paralinguistic skills than low selfmonitors (Mill, 1984; Penn et al., 1999). By understanding this as a theory of mind deficit
instead of a personality variable, it may be easier to learn ways to compensate for it, or
instance by having face to face meetings instead of phone conferences. If viewed as a
deficit, employers may be more flexible in order to help their employees achieve their
best work.
An additional implication of the current research has to do with clinical work.
Theory of mind deficits are often toted as the major explanation behind ASDs and other
mental disorders. Although research on both self-monitoring and theory of mind has been
done with schizophrenic patients (i.e. Cassetta & Goghari, 2014; Penn et al., 1999;), the
connections between the two constructs may help clinical psychologists in learning more
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about the patients. By understanding that someone who may have theory of mind deficits
is more likely to be a low self-monitor, then the doctors can attempt to get through to
them in a variety of different ways that they may have not tried before. For instance, a
doctor may put a patient with theory of mind deficits in a group class to help them
develop proper social skills. Someone who is a low self-monitor would learn quicker and
more efficiently by being given real life scenarios and asked what they would do in that
scenario since it allows them to rely to their internal beliefs and attitudes. On the other
hand, someone who is a high self-monitor may learn better by watching other people act
out a scenario, since they attend more to the environment and people surrounding them.
Despite obtaining such significant results, the current research is not without its
limitations. An important limitation to make note of is the possibility of researcher bias.
One researcher, who was aware of the hypothesis, was responsible for sampling,
collecting and analyzing all of the data. The Adult Faux-Pas Recognition Task involves
the researcher reading stories and questions to the participant and recording their
answers. Although the researcher made all efforts to stay as unbiased as possible, it is
important to note the possibility that the researcher’s interactions, specifically the tone
and speed of voice, may have an influence on how the participants reacted to the social
situations featured in the stories. As Mill (1984) showed in their research, high selfmonitors are better than low self-monitors at decoding others’ true intentions through
verbal cues. Although the current research showed this same result through the Faux-Pas
Recognition task, this result may be accentuated by the researchers’ tone of voice while
administering the task. It is important to note however, that the researcher was not aware
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of the participants’ self-monitoring scores before administering the Faux-Pas Recognition
Task, so this limitation could not have affected the results. However, future studies using
this measure should consider recording a researcher or computer asking the questions so
they are asked in the exact same tone for each participant, in order to remove any
possible risks.
Although the sample size was large enough to run multiple statistical analyses, the
diversity of the sample leaves something to be desired. Participants were sampled
completely from the Union College Community, with 64 out of the 66 participants being
students between the ages of 17 and 22 years old. These students have all experienced
some private liberal arts college education in the Northeast United States, so the sample
is lacking data from a variety of participants of different ages, socioeconomic classes, or
cultures.
Data on participants’ intellectual disabilities, except for autism, were not collected
and even so only a handful of participants scored high enough on the Autism Spectrum
Quotient to indicate that they were on the spectrum. Even though a significant difference
was seen between high and low self-monitors, the sample did not see participants scoring
drastically low on theory of mind tasks, meaning the sample did not include participants
with very severe theory of mind deficits. The lack of data on participants’ intellectual
disabilities is a limitation in itself, as other mental disabilities besides autism can result in
theory of mind deficits. Future studies should expand the sample to include a variety of
socioeconomic classes, cultures and different degrees of mental health to grasp a full
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understanding of the degree to which theory of mind deficits and self-monitoring
interconnect to play a role in determining one’s behavior.
Future studies on the two constructs have a variety of directions to expand on the
current research. One interesting direction would be to perform more research on
children’s self-monitoring characteristics and how it develops. Although a variety of
research has been done on the development of theory of mind in children, only a handful
of studies address self-monitoring. By researching the exact ages that self-monitoring
starts to develop, future studies may be able to have a better understanding of the chicken
and the egg scenario between the two constructs. In order to trace the development of
both theory of mind and self-monitoring in children it would be important to run a
longitudinal study using the same subjects throughout, in order to fully research how the
two variables work together in determining one’s behavior.
Another very interesting direction with future research has to do with the
possibility of manipulating one’s self-monitoring characteristics. Previous research on
theory of mind deficits has shown that stimulant medication improves those deficits in
children and adolescents with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) (Maoz et
al., 2014). Stimulant medication, such as Adderall and Ritalin, has long been known for
improving those with ADHD’s executive functioning and cognitive abilities, but research
by Maoz et al. (2014) show that it helps the child’s empathetic abilities, as well as that
children perform better on Theory of Mind tasks when they are taking the medication.
Although self-monitoring has been previously thought to be a relatively stable
characteristic (Snyder & Monson, 1975; Snyder & Tanke, 1975), the current research’s
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connection between theory of mind and self-monitoring questions this stability. If
stimulants can improve a person’s social abilities and theory of mind deficits, then is it
possible that stimulant medication can also affect their person’s self-monitoring
characteristics? Future studies on ADHD patients should measure their self-monitoring
before and after medication to see if self-monitoring reacts to medication the same way as
theory of mind deficits.
The current research has shown an exciting connection between the two
constructs of self-monitoring and theory of mind. It may be that low self-monitors attend
to their internal state to determine their attitudes and behaviors because they have theory
of mind deficits preventing them from taking on the perspectives of other. In connection,
high self-monitors are more socially skilled than low self-monitors when in a variety of
environments, such as the workplace, because they may possess better developed theory
of minds. Future studies on these two constructs should attempt to expand the diversity of
the sample, as well as research other variables that the two may connect through.
Nevertheless, the current research recommends that future studies on both selfmonitoring and theory of mind take these newfound connections into account.
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Appendix A

V. Stone
S.Baron-Cohen

FP test

Faux Pas Recognition Test
(Adult Version)
Created by Valerie Stone & Simon Baron-Cohen

Correct citations for use of this test:
Stone, V.E., Baron-Cohen, S. & Knight, R.T. (1998). Frontal lobe contributions to theory of mind. Journal
of Cognitive Neuroscience, 10, 640-656.
Gregory, C. , Lough, S., Stone, V.E., Erzinclioglu, S., Martin, L., Baron-Cohen, S. & Hodges, J. (2002).
Theory of mind in frontotemporal dementia and Alzheimer's disease: Theoretical and practical
implications. Brain, 125, 752-64.

The adult version was roughly based on the children’s version of the test used in:
Baron-Cohen, S., O’Riordan, M., Jones, R., Stone, V.E. & Plaisted, K. (1999). A new test of social
sensitivity: Detection of faux pas in normal children and children with Asperger syndrome. Journal of
Autism and Developmental Disorders, 29, 407-418.
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1.
Vicky was at a party at her friend Oliver’s house. She was talking to Oliver when another
woman came up to them. She was one of Oliver’s neighbors. The woman said, "Hello," then
turned to Vicky and said, " I don't think we've met. I’m Maria, what's your name?" "I’m Vicky."
"Would anyone like something to drink?" Oliver asked.
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?

Did Oliver know that Vicky and Maria did not know each other?

How do you think Vicky felt?

Control questions: In the story, where was Vicky?

Did Vicky and Maria know each other?
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2.
Helen's husband was throwing a surprise party for her birthday. He invited Sarah, a friend
of Helen's, and said, "Don't tell anyone, especially Helen." The day before the party, Helen was
over at Sarah's and Sarah spilled some coffee on a new dress that was hanging over her chair.
"Oh!" said Sarah, "I was going to wear this to your party!" "What party?" said Helen. "Come on,"
said Sarah, "Let's go see if we can get the stain out."
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?

Did Sarah remember that the party was a surprise party?

How do you think Helen felt?

Control question: In the story, who was the surprise party for?

What got spilled on the dress?
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3.
Jim was shopping for a shirt to match his suit. The salesman showed him several shirts.
Jim looked at them and finally found one that was the right color. But when he went to the
dressing room and tried it on, it didn't fit. "I'm afraid it's too small," he said to the salesman. "Not
to worry," the salesman said. "We'll get some in next week in a larger size." "Great. I'll just come
back then," Jim said.
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?

When he tried on the shirt, did Jim know they didn’t have it in his size?

How do you think Jim felt?

Control question: In the story, what was Jim shopping for?

Why was he going to come back next week?
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4.
Jill had just moved into a new apartment. Jill went shopping and bought some new curtains
for her bedroom. When she had just finished decorating the apartment, her best friend, Lisa, came
over. Jill gave her a tour of the apartment and asked, "How do you like my bedroom?" "Those
curtains are horrible," Lisa said. "I hope you're going to get some new ones!"
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?

Did Lisa know who had bought the curtains?

How do you think Jill felt?

Control question: In the story, what had Jill just bought?

How long had Jill lived in this apartment?
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5.
Bob went to the barber for a haircut. "How would you like it cut?" the barber asked. "I'd
like the same style as I have now, only take about an inch off," Bob replied. The barber cut it a
little uneven in the front, so he had to cut it shorter to even it out. "I'm afraid it's a bit shorter than
you asked for," said the barber. "Oh well," Bob said, "it'll grow out."
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?

While he was getting the haircut, did Bob know the barber was cutting it too short?

How do you think Bob felt?

Control question: In the story, how did Bob want his hair cut?

How did the barber cut his hair?
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6.
John stopped off at the gas station on the way home to fill up his car. He gave the cashier
his credit card. The cashier ran it through the machine at the counter. "I'm sorry," she said, "the
machine won't accept your card." "Hmmm, that's funny," John said. "Well, I'll just pay in cash."
He gave her twenty dollars and said, "I filled up the tank with unleaded."
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?

When he handed his card to the cashier, did John know the machine wouldn’t take his card?

How do you think John felt?

Control question: In the story, what did John stop off to buy?

Why did he pay in cash?
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7.
Sally is a three-year-old girl with a round face and short blonde hair. She was at her Aunt
Carol's house. The doorbell rang and her Aunt Carol answered it. It was Mary, a neighbor. "Hi,"
Aunt Carol said, "Nice of you to stop by." Mary said, "Hello," then looked at Sally and said, "Oh, I
don't think I've met this little boy. What's your name?"
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?

Did Mary know that Sally was a girl?
How do you think Sally felt?

Control question: In the story, where was Sally?
Who came to visit?
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8.
Joan took her dog, Zack, out to the park. She threw a stick for him to chase. When they
had been there a while, Pam, a neighbor of hers, passed by. They chatted for a few minutes. Then
Pam asked, "Are you heading home? Would you like to walk together?" "Sure," Joan said. She
called Zack, but he was busy chasing pigeons and didn't come. "It looks like he's not ready to go,"
she said. "I think we'll stay." "OK," Pam said. "I'll see you later."
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?
When she invited her, did Pam know that Joan wouldn’t be able to walk home with her?

How do you think Pam felt?

Control question: In the story, where had Joan taken Zack?

Why didn’t she walk with her friend Pam?
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9.
Joanne had had a major role in last year's school play and she really wanted the lead role
this year. She took acting classes, and in the spring, she auditioned for the play. The day the
decisions were posted, she went before class to check the list of who had made the play. She hadn't
made the lead and had instead been cast in a minor role. She ran into her boyfriend in the hall and
told him what had happened. "I'm sorry,” he said. "You must be disappointed." "Yes," Joanne
answered, "I have to decide whether to take this role."
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?

When he first ran into her in the hall, did Joanne’s boyfriend know that she hadn’t gotten the role?
How do you think Joanne felt?

Control question: In the story, what role did Joanne get?

What kind of role had she had the previous year?

What did her boyfriend say?
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10.
Joe was at the library. He found the book he wanted about hiking in the Grand Canyon and
went up to the front counter to check it out. When he looked in his wallet, he discovered he had
left his library card at home. "I'm sorry," he said to the woman behind the counter. "I seem to have
left my library card at home." "That's OK," she answered. "Tell me your name, and if we have you
in the computer, you can check out the book just by showing me your driver’s license."
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?

When Joe went into the library, did he realize he didn’t have his library card?

How do you think Joe felt?

Control question: In the story, what book did Joe get at the library?

Was he going to be able to check it out?

V. Stone
S.Baron-Cohen

FP test

11.
Jean West, a manager in Abco Software Design, called a meeting for all of the staff. "I
have something to tell you," she said. "John Morehouse, one of our accountants, is very sick with
cancer and he's in the hospital." Everyone was quiet, absorbing the news, when Robert, a software
engineer, arrived late. "Hey, I heard this great joke last night!” Robert said. “What did the
terminally ill patient say to his doctor?" Jean said, "Okay, let's get down to business in the
meeting."
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?

Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?

When he came in, did Robert know that the accountant was sick with cancer?

How do you think Jean, the manager, felt?

Control question: In the story, what did Jean, the manager, tell the people in the meeting?

Who arrived late to the meeting?
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12.
Mike, a nine-year-old boy, just started at a new school. He was in one of the stalls in the
restroom at school. Joe and Peter, two other boys, came in and were standing at the sinks talking.
Joe said, "You know that new guy in the class? His name's Mike. Doesn't he look weird? And
he's so short!" Mike came out of the stall and Joe and Peter saw him. Peter said, "Oh hi, Mike!
Are you going out to play football now?"
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?

When Joe was talking to Peter, did he know that Mike was in one of the stalls?

How do you think Mike felt?

Control question: In the story, where was Mike while Joe and Peter were talking?

What did Joe say about Mike?
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13.
Kim's cousin, Scott, was coming to visit and Kim made an apple pie especially for him.
After dinner, she said, "I made a pie just for you. It's in the kitchen." "Mmmm," replied Scott, "It
smells great! I love pies, except for apple, of course."
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?

When he smelled the pie, did Scott know it was an apple pie?

How do you think Kim felt?

Control question: In the story, what kind of pie did Kim make?
How did Kim and Scott know each other?

V. Stone
S.Baron-Cohen

FP test

14.
Jeanette bought her friend, Anne, a crystal bowl for a wedding gift. Anne had a big
wedding and there were a lot of presents to keep track of. About a year later, Jeanette was over one
night at Anne's for dinner. Jeanette dropped a wine bottle by accident on the crystal bowl and the
bowl shattered. "I'm really sorry. I've broken the bowl," said Jeanette. "Don't worry," said Anne. "I
never liked it anyway. Someone gave it to me for my wedding."
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?

Did Anne remember that Jeannette had given her the bowl?

How do you think Jeanette felt?

Control question: In the story, what did Jeanette give Anne for her wedding?
How did the bowl get broken?
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15.
At Fernhaven Elementary School, there was a story competition. Everyone was invited to
enter. Several of the fifth graders did so. Christine, a fifth grader, loved the story she had entered
in the competition. A few days later, the results of the competition were announced: Christine’s
story had not won anything and a classmate, Jake, had won first prize. The following day,
Christine was sitting on a bench with Jake. They were looking at his first prize trophy. Jake said,
"It was so easy to win that contest. All of the other stories in the competition were terrible."
"Where are you going to put your trophy?" asked Christine.
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?

Did Jake know that Christine had entered a story in the contest?

How do you think Christine felt?

Control question: In the story, who won the contest?
Did Christine’s story win anything?
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16.
Tim was in a restaurant. He spilled some coffee on the floor by accident. "I'll get you
another cup of coffee," said the waiter. The waiter was gone for a while. Jack was another
customer in the restaurant, standing by the cashier waiting to pay. Tim went up to Jack and said, "I
spilled coffee over by my table. Can you mop it up?"
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?

Did Tim know that Jack was another customer?

How do you think Jack felt?

Control question: In the story, why was Jack standing by the cashier?

What did Tim spill?
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17.
Eleanor was waiting at the bus stop. The bus was late and she had been standing there a
long time. She was 65 and it made her tired to stand for so long. When the bus finally came, it was
crowded and there were no seats left. She saw a neighbor, Paul, standing in the aisle of the bus.
"Hello, Eleanor," he said. "Were you waiting there long?" "About 20 minutes," she replied. A
young man who was sitting down got up. "Ma'am, would you like my seat?"
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?

When Eleanor got on the bus, did Paul know how long she had been waiting?

How do you think Eleanor felt?

Control question: In the story, why was Eleanor waiting at the bus stop for 20 minutes?

Were there any seats available on the bus when she got on?
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18.
Roger had just started work at a new office. One day, in the coffee room, he was talking to
a new friend, Andrew. "What does your wife do?" Andrew asked. "She's a lawyer," answered
Roger. A few minutes later, Claire came into the coffee room looking irritated. "I just had the
worst phone call," she told them. "Lawyers are all so arrogant and greedy. I can't stand them."
"Do you want to come look over these reports?" Andrew asked Claire. "Not now," she replied, "I
need my coffee."
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?

Did Claire know that Roger’s wife was a lawyer?

How do you think Roger felt?

Control question: In the story, what does Roger's wife do for a living?
Where were Roger and Andrew talking?
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19.
Richard bought a new car, a red Peugeot. A few weeks after he bought it, he backed it into
his neighbor Ted's car, an old beat-up Volvo. His new car wasn’t damaged at all and he didn’t do
much damage to Ted’s car either -- just a scratch in the paint above the wheel. Still, he went up
and knocked on the door. When Ted answered, Richard said, "I'm really sorry. I've just put a small
scratch on your car.” Ted looked at it and said, "Don't worry. It was only an accident."
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?

Did Richard know what his neighbor Ted’s reaction would be?
How do you think Ted felt?

Control question: In the story, what did Richard do to Ted’s car?

How did Ted react?
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20.
Louise went to the butcher to buy some meat. It was crowded and noisy in the shop. She
asked the butcher, "Do you have any free-range chickens?" He nodded and started to wrap up a
roasted chicken for her. "Excuse me," she said, "I must not have spoken clearly. I asked if you had
any free-range chickens." "Oh, sorry," the butcher said, "we're all out of them."
Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
If yes, ask:
Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?
Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?

Why do you think he/she said it?

When he started wrapping up a chicken for Louise, did the butcher know that she wanted a freerange chicken?

How do you think Louise felt?

Control question: In the story, where did Louise go?

Why did the butcher start to wrap up a roasted chicken for her?
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Administering the faux pas task:
Print out a version of the test that has just the stories, not the questions you ask. Put this in front of
the participant. Say, “I’m going to be reading you some brief stories and asking you some
questions about it. You have a copy of the story in front of you so you can read along and go back
to it.”
Then read the stories out loud and ask the questions. If they say to the first question, no, no one
said anything they shouldn’t have said or that was awkward, skip to the control questions for that
story.
Make sure you ask the control questions, whether or not they say “yes or no” about someone saying
something awkward.
Scoring the faux pas task:
Basically, use common sense. For each story containing a faux pas (stories 2, 4, 7, 11-16, and 18),
the subject gets 1 point for each question answered correctly.
First question: "Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said?"
Faux pas stories:
Control stories:

Correct: Yes
Incorrect: Yes

Incorrect: No
Correct: No

Second question: "Who said something they shouldn't have said?"
Any answer that unambiguously identifies the correct person is correct.
story about calling little girl a boy: Mary (also acceptable: the neighbor)
story about crystal bowl: Anne (also acceptable: the hostess, or the woman who got
married, etc.)
story about lawyers: Claire (also acceptable: the woman, or the woman in a bad mood,
etc.)
story about curtains: Lisa (also acceptable: the friend)
story about cancer joke: Robert (also acceptable: the guy who came in late)
story about losing story contest: Jake (also acceptable: the guy who won)
story about spilled coffee: Tim (also acceptable: the guy who spilled his coffee)
story about new kid in school: Joe (also acceptable: Joe and Peter)
story about surprise party: Sarah (also acceptable: the woman who spilled the coffee)
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story about pie: Joe (also acceptable: Kim's cousin)
Subjects who answer "no" to the first question don't get asked this question and score a 0 for this
one.
Third question: "Why shouldn't they have said it?"
Any reasonable answer that makes reference to the faux pas is acceptable. The subject does not
have to explicitly mention mental states, as in, "He didn't know about the guy who was sick with
cancer, but everyone else did." It is sufficient to say, "Because John is terminally ill," or "because
the guy standing right there is married to a lawyer," or "you shouldn't walk into a new apartment
and criticize it; you don't know who bought what." This question only gets scored as incorrect if
the person's answer doesn't reflect an understanding of the faux pas, that is, of what would have
been offensive. Examples (from amygdala patients): "The neighbor shouldn't have called her little.
Kids like to feel grown up." (Misses the point that Sally is a girl, not a boy.) "Claire shouldn't tell
him she needs her coffee." (Misses the insult to Roger.) "You shouldn't come into a meeting late."
(Doesn't mention the inappropriate joke.)
Subjects who answer "no" to the first question don't get asked this question, and score a 0 for this
one.
Fourth question: "Why did they say it?" or "Why do you think they said it?"
Again, any reasonable answer that makes reference to the faux pas is acceptable. As long as the
subject's answer indicates that they understand that one of the story characters didn't know
something or didn't realize something, it is correct, even if they do not explicitly mention mental
states. This question gets scored as incorrect if the subject seems to think that the person said it
deliberately. Some more examples, also from patients: "Tim shouldn't order around other
customers. He just basically went up to an equal and said, 'On your knees, boy.'" (Doesn't reflect
an understanding that Tim mistook Jack for someone who worked at the restaurant.) "He was
trying to put Christine down, make himself one up by gloating." (Doesn't reflect that he didn't
know Christine was in the contest.) "She was trying to make Helen feel jealous." (Looks like a
confabulation, and doesn't mention surprise party.) Some patients also just say, "I don't know,"
which also gets a zero.
Subjects who answer "no" to the first question don't get asked this question, and score a 0 for this
one.
Fifth question: Did X know that Y? Again, this is to test whether they realize the faux pas was
unintentional. Scoring is straightforward.
Sixth question: How did X feel? A test of subjects’ empathy for the story characters. Should
reflect feelings of hurt, anger, embarrassment, disappointment, as appropriate.
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Seventh and eighth questions: Control questions. These should tell you if the person has gotten
confused and forgotten the details of the story. Answers are pretty obvious. These are scored
separately from the other questions.
Examples for faux pas stories,
In the story, where was Sally? "At her aunt Carol's house." (I think one
subject said, "In the doorway next to her aunt," and I scored it as correct.)
In the story, what had Jeannette given Anne for her wedding? "A crystal bowl,"
"a bowl."
In the story, what did Robert's wife do for a living? "She was a lawyer."
In the story, what had Jill just bought? "New curtains," "curtains."
In the story, what had Jean West just told people in the meeting? "VP had
cancer."
In the story, who won the competition? "Jake."
In the story, where was Jack standing? "By the cashier."
In the story, where was Mike while Joe and Peter were talking? "In the stalls
(cubicles)."
In the story, who was Helen's husband throwing a surprise party for? "Helen."
In the story, what kind of pie had Kim made? "Apple."
Dorsolateral frontal patients, for example, often got some of these wrong. One patient said the
surprise party was for Sarah's birthday, and that Helen was upset because her husband was
throwing a party for another woman, and she wondered if they were having an affair.
All subjects get asked these questions, even if they answer "no" to the first question.
Overall, there are a total of 60 points that subjects can get on the faux-pas-related questions on the
10 faux pas stories. Someone who answers "no" to the first question for a story will get 0 points for
that whole story. On the 10 control stories, score 2 points if they get it correct that no one said
anything they shouldn't have said, 0 if they say someone said something they shouldn't have said,
for a total of 20 points on the control stories. Score 1 point each for control questions on these
stories.
Report separate scores for faux-pas-related questions on the faux pas stories, control questions on
the faux pas stories, the faux-pas-related question on the control stories, and the control questions
on the control stories. Then you can get a feel for if they are making more faux-pas-related errors
(theory of mind errors) than errors on the factual control questions.
If anyone answers any of the control questions incorrectly, their other errors for that story should be
interpreted with caution. You can throw out their other answers for that story and score their
answers on the remaining stories, calculating a percent correct out of 54 points total, or 48 or
whatever.
Discrepancies between answers to the first question and to the fifth question should be noted.

Appendix B

For all users of the revised version of the Adult Reading the Mind in the Eyes
Test.
Enclosed you will find
the adult version of the above test
the word definition handout,
the correct answers.
A copy of the paper describing the test in full
As you know, publication details of the original version appeared in the Journal of Child
Psychology and Psychiatry, 38, 813-822 (1997). The revised version which we have sent
you was published in the Journal of Child Psychiatry and Psychiatry, 42, 241-252
(2001).
A child version of this test has also been developed and is available upon request. It was
published in the Journal of Developmental and Learning Disorders, 5, 47-78 (2001).
We would, of course, appreciate hearing of any results you obtain with this test.
Thank you.
Best wishes

Simon Baron-Cohen

Adult Eyes Instructions
For each set of eyes, choose and circle which word best describes what the person in the
picture is thinking or feeling. You may feel that more than one word is applicable but
please choose just one word, the word which you consider to be most suitable. Before
making your choice, make sure that you have read all 4 words. You should try to do the
task as quickly as possible but you will not be timed. If you really dont know what a
word means you can look it up in the definition handout.

WORD DEFINITIONS
ACCUSING

blaming
The policeman was accusing the man of stealing a wallet.

AFFECTIONATE

showing fondness towards someone
Most mothers are affectionate to their babies by giving them
lots of kisses and cuddles.

AGHAST

horrified, astonished, alarmed
Jane was aghast when she discovered her house had been
burgled.

ALARMED

fearful, worried, filled with anxiety
Claire was alarmed when she thought she was being followed
home.

AMUSED

finding something funny
I was amused by a funny joke someone told me.

ANNOYED

irritated, displeased
Jack was annoyed when he found out he had missed the last
bus home.

ANTICIPATING

expecting
At the start of the football match, the fans were anticipating a
quick goal.

ANXIOUS

worried, tense, uneasy
The student was feeling anxious before taking her final
exams.

APOLOGETIC

feeling sorry
The waiter was very apologetic when he spilt soup all over the
customer.

ARROGANT

conceited, self-important, having a big opinion of oneself
The arrogant man thought he knew more about politics than
everyone else in the room.

ASHAMED

overcome with shame or guilt
The boy felt ashamed when his mother discovered him
stealing money from her purse.
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ASSERTIVE

confident, dominant, sure of oneself
The assertive woman demanded that the shop give her a
refund.

BAFFLED

confused, puzzled, dumbfounded
The detectives were completely baffled by the murder case.

BEWILDERED

utterly confused, puzzled, dazed
The child was bewildered when visiting the big city for the
first time.

CAUTIOUS

careful, wary
Sarah was always a bit cautious when talking to someone she
did not know.

COMFORTING

consoling, compassionate
The nurse was comforting the wounded soldier.

CONCERNED

worried, troubled
The doctor was concerned when his patient took a turn for the
worse.

CONFIDENT

self-assured, believing in oneself
The tennis player was feeling very confident about winning
his match.

CONFUSED

puzzled, perplexed
Lizzie was so confused by the directions given to her, she got
lost.

CONTEMPLATIVE reflective, thoughtful, considering
John was in a contemplative mood on the eve of his 60th
birthday.
CONTENTED

satisfied
After a nice walk and a good meal, David felt very contented.

CONVINCED

certain, absolutely positive
Richard was convinced he had come to the right decision.

CURIOUS

inquisitive, inquiring, prying
Louise was curious about the strange shaped parcel.

DECIDING

making your mind up
The man was deciding whom to vote for in the election.
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DECISIVE

already made your mind up
Jane looked very decisive as she walked into the polling
station.

DEFIANT

insolent, bold, dont care what anyone else thinks
The animal protester remained defiant even after being sent to
prison.

DEPRESSED

miserable
George was depressed when he didn't receive any birthday
cards.

DESIRE

passion, lust, longing for
Kate had a strong desire for chocolate.

DESPONDENT

gloomy, despairing, without hope
Gary was despondent when he did not get the job he wanted.

DISAPPOINTED

displeased, disgruntled
Manchester United fans were disappointed not to win the
Championship.

DISPIRITED

glum, miserable, low
Adam was dispirited when he failed his exams.

DISTRUSTFUL

suspicious, doubtful, wary
The old woman was distrustful of the stranger at her door.

DOMINANT

commanding, bossy
The sergeant major looked dominant as he inspected the new
recruits.

DOUBTFUL

dubious, suspicious, not really believing
Mary was doubtful that her son was telling the truth.

DUBIOUS

doubtful, suspicious
Peter was dubious when offered a surprisingly cheap
television in a pub.

EAGER

keen
On Christmas morning, the children were eager to open their
presents.

EARNEST

having a serious intention
Harry was very earnest about his religious beliefs.
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EMBARRASSED

ashamed
After forgetting a colleague's name, Jenny felt very
embarrassed.

ENCOURAGING

hopeful, heartening, supporting
All the parents were encouraging their children in the school
sports day.

ENTERTAINED

absorbed and amused or pleased by something
I was very entertained by the magician.

ENTHUSIASTIC

very eager, keen
Susan felt very enthusiastic about her new fitness plan.

FANTASIZING

daydreaming
Emma was fantasizing about being a film star.

FASCINATED

captivated, really interested
At the seaside, the children were fascinated by the creatures
in the rock pools.

FEARFUL

terrified, worried
In the dark streets, the women felt fearful.

FLIRTATIOUS

brazen, saucy, teasing, playful
Connie was accused of being flirtatious when she winked at a
stranger at a party.
confused, nervous and upset
Sarah felt a bit flustered when she realised how late she was
for the meeting and that she had forgotten an important
document.

FLUSTERED

FRIENDLY

sociable, amiable
The friendly girl showed the tourists the way to the town
centre.

GRATEFUL

thankful
Kelly was very grateful for the kindness shown by the
stranger.

GUILTY

feeling sorry for doing something wrong
Charlie felt guilty about having an affair.

HATEFUL

showing intense dislike
The two sisters were hateful to each other and always
fighting.
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HOPEFUL

optimistic
Larry was hopeful that the post would bring good news.

HORRIFIED

terrified, appalled
The man was horrified to discover that his new wife was
already married.

HOSTILE

unfriendly
The two neighbours were hostile towards each other because
of an argument about loud music.

IMPATIENT

restless, wanting something to happen soon
Jane grew increasingly impatient as she waited for her friend
who was already 20 minutes late.

IMPLORING

begging, pleading
Nicola looked imploring as she tried to persuade her dad to
lend her the car.

INCREDULOUS

not believing
Simon was incredulous when he heard that he had won the
lottery.

INDECISIVE

unsure, hesitant, unable to make your mind up
Tammy was so indecisive that she couldn't even decide what
to have for lunch.

INDIFFERENT

disinterested, unresponsive, don't care
Terry was completely indifferent as to whether they went to
the cinema or the pub.

INSISTING

demanding, persisting, maintaining
After a work outing, Frank was insisting he paid the bill for
everyone.

INSULTING

rude, offensive
The football crowd was insulting the referee after he gave a
penalty.

INTERESTED

inquiring, curious
After seeing Jurassic Park, Hugh grew very interested in
dinosaurs.

INTRIGUED

very curious, very interested
A mystery phone call intrigued Zoe.
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IRRITATED

exasperated, annoyed
Frances was irritated by all the junk mail she received.

JEALOUS

envious
Tony was jealous of all the taller, better-looking boys in his
class.

JOKING

being funny, playful
Gary was always joking with his friends.

NERVOUS

apprehensive, tense, worried
Just before her job interview, Alice felt very nervous.

OFFENDED

insulted, wounded, having hurt feelings
When someone made a joke about her weight, Martha felt very
offended.

PANICKED

distraught, feeling of terror or anxiety
On waking to find the house on fire, the whole family was
panicked.

PENSIVE

thinking about something slightly worrying
Susie looked pensive on the way to meeting her boyfriend's
parents for the first time.

PERPLEXED

bewildered, puzzled, confused
Frank was perplexed by the disappearance of his garden
gnomes.

PLAYFUL

full of high spirits and fun
Neil was feeling playful at his birthday party.

PREOCCUPIED

absorbed, engrossed in one's own thoughts
Worrying about her mother's illness made Debbie
preoccupied at work

PUZZLED

perplexed, bewildered, confused
After doing the crossword for an hour, June was still puzzled
by one clue.

REASSURING

supporting, encouraging, giving someone confidence
Andy tried to look reassuring as he told his wife that her new
dress did suit her.
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REFLECTIVE

contemplative, thoughtful
George was in a reflective mood as he thought about what
he'd done with his life.

REGRETFUL

sorry
Lee was always regretful that he had never travelled when he
was younger.

RELAXED

taking it easy, calm, carefree
On holiday, Pam felt happy and relaxed.

RELIEVED

freed from worry or anxiety
At the restaurant, Ray was relieved to find that he had not
forgotten his wallet.

RESENTFUL

bitter, hostile
The businessman felt very resentful towards his younger
colleague who had been promoted above him.

SARCASTIC

cynical, mocking, scornful
The comedian made a sarcastic comment when someone
came into the theatre late.

SATISFIED

content, fulfilled
Steve felt very satisfied after he had got his new flat just how
he wanted it.

SCEPTICAL

doubtful, suspicious, mistrusting
Patrick looked sceptical as someone read out his horoscope to
him.

SERIOUS

solemn, grave
The bank manager looked serious as he refused Nigel an
overdraft.

STERN

severe, strict, firm
The teacher looked very stern as he told the class off.

SUSPICIOUS

disbelieving, suspecting, doubting
After Sam had lost his wallet for the second time at work, he
grew suspicious of one of his colleagues.

SYMPATHETIC

kind, compassionate
The nurse looked sympathetic as she told the patient the bad
news.
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TENTATIVE

hesitant, uncertain, cautious
Andrew felt a bit tentative as he went into the room full of
strangers.

TERRIFIED

alarmed, fearful
The boy was terrified when he thought he saw a ghost.

THOUGHTFUL

thinking about something
Phil looked thoughtful as he sat waiting for the girlfriend he
was about to finish with.

THREATENING

menacing, intimidating
The large, drunken man was acting in a very threatening way.

UNEASY

unsettled, apprehensive, troubled
Karen felt slightly uneasy about accepting a lift from the man
she had only met that day.

UPSET

agitated, worried, uneasy
The man was very upset when his mother died.

WORRIED

anxious, fretful, troubled
When her cat went missing, the girl was very worried.
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practice

jealous

arrogant

panicked

hateful

1

playful

irritated

comforting

bored

2

terrified

arrogant

upset

annoyed

3

joking

flustered

desire

convinced

4

joking

amused

insisting

relaxed

5

irritated

worried

sarcastic

friendly

6

aghast

impatient

fantasizing

alarmed

7

apologetic

uneasy

friendly

dispirited

8

despondent

shy

relieved

excited

9

annoyed

horrified

hostile

preoccupied

10

cautious

bored

insisting

aghast

11

terrified

amused

regretful

flirtatious

12

indifferent

sceptical

embarrassed

dispirited

13

decisive

threatening

anticipating

shy

14

irritated

depressed

disappointed

accusing

15

contemplative

flustered

encouraging

amused

16

irritated

encouraging

thoughtful

sympathetic

17

doubtful

playful

affectionate

aghast

18

decisive

aghast

amused

bored

19

arrogant

sarcastic

grateful

tentative

20

dominant

guilty

friendly

horrified

21

embarrassed

confused

fantasizing

panicked

22

preoccupied

insisting

grateful

imploring

23

contented

defiant

apologetic

curious

24

pensive

irritated

excited

hostile

25

panicked

despondent

incredulous

interested

26

alarmed

hostile

shy

anxious

27

joking

cautious

arrogant

reassuring

28

interested

affectionate

joking

contented

29

impatient

irritated

aghast

reflective

30

grateful

flirtatious

hostile

disappointed

31

ashamed

confident

joking

dispirited

32

serious

ashamed

bewildered

alarmed

33

embarrassed

fantasizing

guilty

concerned

34

aghast

baffled

distrustful

terrified

35

puzzled

nervous

insisting

contemplative

36

ashamed

nervous

suspicious

indecisive

Record Sheet

Age:....................................... Today’s date:.......................................

.Gender: ............................................................................
P
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

jealous
panicked
playful
comforting
terrified
upset
joking
flustered
joking
insisting
irritated
sarcastic
aghast
fantasizing
apologetic
friendly
despondent relieved
annoyed
hostile
cautious
insisting
terrified
amused
indifferent
embarrassed
decisive
anticipating
irritated
disappointed
contemplative flustered
irritated
thoughtful
doubtful
affectionate
decisive
amused
arrogant
grateful
dominant
friendly
embarrassed fantasizing
preoccupied grateful
contented
apologetic
pensive
irritated
panicked
incredulous
alarmed
shy
joking
cautious
interested
joking
impatient
aghast
grateful
flirtatious
ashamed
confident
serious
ashamed
embarrassed guilty
aghast
baffled
puzzled
nervous
ashamed
nervous

arrogant
irritated
arrogant
desire
amused
worried
impatient
uneasy
shy
horrified
bored
regretful
sceptical
threatening
depressed
encouraging
encouraging
playful
aghast
sarcastic
guilty
confused
insisting
defiant
excited
despondent
hostile
arrogant
affectionate
irritated
hostile
joking
bewildered
fantasizing
distrustful
insisting
suspicious

hateful
bored
annoyed
convinced
relaxed
friendly
alarmed
dispirited
excited
preoccupied
aghast
flirtatious
dispirited
shy
accusing
amused
sympathetic
aghast
bored
tentative
horrified
panicked
imploring
curious
hostile
interested
anxious
reassuring
contented
reflective
disappointed
dispirited
alarmed
concerned
terrified
contemplative
indecisive

Answers - Adults
P
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

jealous
playful
terrified
joking
joking
irritated
aghast
apologetic
despondent
annoyed
cautious
terrified
indifferent
decisive
irritated
contemplative
irritated
doubtful
decisive
arrogant
dominant
embarrassed
preoccupied
contented
pensive
panicked
alarmed
joking
interested
impatient
grateful
ashamed
serious
embarrassed
aghast
puzzled
ashamed

panicked
comforting
upset
flustered
insisting
sarcastic
fantasizing
friendly
relieved
hostile
insisting
amused
embarrassed
anticipating
disappointed
flustered
thoughtful
affectionate
amused
grateful
friendly
fantasizing
grateful
apologetic
irritated
incredulous
shy
cautious
joking
aghast
flirtatious
confident
ashamed
guilty
baffled
nervous
nervous

arrogant
hateful
M
irritated
bored
M
arrogant
annoyed M
convinced F
desire
amused
relaxed
M
friendly M
worried
impatient
alarmed
F
dispirited M
uneasy
shy
excited
M
horrified preoccupied F
bored
aghast
M
flirtatious M
regretful
dispirited M
sceptical
threatening
shy
M
depressed
accusing M
encouraging amused
F
encouraging sympathetic M
playful
aghast
F
aghast
bored
F
sarcastic
tentative F
guilty
horrified M
confused
panicked F
insisting
imploring F
curious
defiant
M
excited
hostile
M
despondent interested F
hostile
anxious
M
arrogant
reassuring F
affectionate contented F
irritated
reflective F
hostile
disappointed F
joking
dispirited F
bewildered
alarmed M
fantasizing concerned M
terrified
distrustful
F
insisting contemplative F
suspicious indecisive M

Appendix C

Personal Reaction Inventory
Directions: The statements below concern your personal reactions to a number of different
situations. No two statements are exactly alike, so consider each statement carefully before
answering. If a statement is TRUE or MOSTLY TRUE as applied to you, fill in the T, and if the
statement is FALSE or MOSTLY FALSE as applied to you, fill in the F.
(T) (F) 1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people.
(T) (F) 2. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things others will like.
(T) (F) 3. I can only argue for ideas that I already believe.
(T) (F) 4. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no
information.
(T) (F) 5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others.
(T) (F) 6. I would probably make a good actor or actress.
(T) (F) 7. In a group of people, I am rarely the center of attention.
(T) (F) 8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different persons.
(T) (F) 9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me.
(T) (F) 10. I’m not always the person I appear to be.
(T) (F) 11. I would not change my opinion (or the way I do things) in order to please someone or
win their favor.
(T) (F) 12. I have considered being an entertainer.
(T) (F) 13. I have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting.
(T) (F) 14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different situations.
(T) (F) 15. At a party, I let others keep the jokes and stories going.
(T) (F) 16. I feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should.
(T) (F) 17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end).
(T) (F) 18. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them.

Appendix D

Using the following scale, please respond to each of the following statements as they
apply to you. There are no correct or incorrect answers. Please respond to each
statement honestly and do not omit any items.
1
definitely
disagree

2
slightly
disagree

3
slightly
agree

4
definitely
agree

Autism-Spectrum Quotient
1._____I prefer to do things with others than on my own.
2._____I prefer to do things the same way over and over again.
3._____If I try to imagine something, I find it very easy to create a picture in my mind.
4._____I frequently get so strongly absorbed in one thing that I lose sight of other things.
5._____I often notice small sounds that others do not.
6._____I usually notice car license plates or similar strings of information.
7._____Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve said is impolite, even though I
think it is polite.
8._____When I’m reading a story, I can easily imagine what the characters might look
like.
9._____I am fascinated by dates (i.e. calendar dates)
10._____In a social group, I can easily keep track of several different person’s
conversations.
11._____I find social situations easy.
12._____I tend to notice details that others do not.
13._____I would rather go to a library than a party.
14._____I find making up stories easy.
15._____I find myself drawn more strongly to people than to things.

16._____I tend to have very strong interests, which I get upset about if I can’t pursue.
17._____I enjoy social chit-chat.
1
definitely
disagree

2
slightly
disagree

3
slightly
agree

4
definitely
agree

18._____When I talk, it isn’t always easy for others to get a word in edgeways.
19._____I am fascinated by numbers.
20._____When I’m reading a story, I find it difficult to work out the characters’
intentions.
21._____I don’t particularly enjoy reading fiction.
22._____I find it hard to make new friends.
23._____I notice patterns in things all the time.
24._____I would rather go the theatre than a museum.
25._____It does not upset me if my daily routine is disturbed.
26._____I frequently find that I don’t know how to keep a conversation going.
27._____I find it easy to “read between the lines” when someone is talking to me.
28._____I usually concentrate more on the whole picture, rather than on small details.
29._____I am not very good at remembering phone numbers.
30._____I don’t usually notice small changes in a situation or a person’s appearance.
31._____I know how to tell if someone listening to me is getting bored.
32._____I find it easy to do more than one thing at once.
33._____When I talk on the phone, I’m not sure when it’s my turn to speak.
34._____I enjoy doing things spontaneously.

35._____I am often the last to understand the point of a joke.
36._____I find it easy to work out what someone is thinking or feeling just by looking at
his or her face.
37._____If there is an interruption, I can switch back to what I was doing very quickly.
1
definitely
disagree

2
slightly
disagree

3
slightly
agree

4
definitely
agree

38._____I am good at social chit-chat.
39._____People often tell me that I keep going on and on about the same thing.
40._____When I was young, I used to enjoy playing games that involved pretending with
other children.
41._____I like to collect information about categories of things (e.g. types of cars, types
of birds, types of train, types of plants, etc.).
42._____I find it difficult to imagine what it would be like to be someone else.
43._____I like to plan my social activities I participate in carefully.
44._____I enjoy social occasions.
45._____I find it difficult to work out people’s intentions.
46._____New situations make me anxious.
47._____I enjoy meeting new people.
48._____I am a good diplomat.
49._____I am not very good at remembering people’s date of birth.
50._____I find it very easy to play games with children that involve pretending.
wireless communication works.

